Iraq and the Balance of Power Theory

Summary

The United States provided intelligence to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, an Aug. 18 New York Times article reported. The article implies that this intelligence sharing should be cause for current embarrassment with an impending war against Iraq. But it was common knowledge that the United States maintained close ties with Iraq during the war, and it must be remembered that events were being played in the context of the Cold War and the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis. Washington played the balance of power game, always the equal-opportunity meddler. The real story here is that maintaining a balance of power between Iran and Iraq no longer appears to be a part of U.S. Persian Gulf policy since Sept. 11.

Analysis

On Aug. 18, the New York Times published an article stating that the United States had provided Iraq with targeting and other battle management support during its long war with Iran in the 1980s. The story focused on the fact that the United States provided aid to an extremely wicked man who used chemical weapons. The article implies that the United States should be embarrassed for its support of Saddam Hussein.

But it was well known both during and after the Iran-Iraq war that the United States had maintained close links with, and had encouraged, Iraq. When the Shah of Iran fell and U.S.-Iranian relations collapsed, the United States sought a means to contain Iran's radical and internationalist Islamic movement.

Apart from the inherent animosity between the U.S. and the Ali Khomeini governments, which included the hostage crisis, the United States was afraid that the Iranians would spread their radicalism throughout the region. In particular, it worried that Iran would endanger the "stability" -- also called pro-Americanism -- of the Arab states on the western shore of the Persian Gulf.

Iran and Iraq fought an extensive war during the 1970s, using the Kurds as chess pieces. At that time the United States regarded Iran as an ally and saw the war as a means of containing Iraq. For a variety of complex reasons, the United States helped negotiate a peace accord between Iran and Iraq in 1975. By 1980, the problem had changed from controlling Iraqi behavior to controlling Iran.

In 1980, the United States had two separate problems. The first was the hostage crisis and the fact that the United States did not have a credible, direct military option. The second was the fear that the Soviet Union would take advantage of what the United States saw as instability in Iran and would strike south to the Persian Gulf. Since air bases in southwestern Afghanistan could provide Soviet aircraft access to Gulf air space, there were military analysts who predicted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the precursor for an attack in the Gulf.

The United States did not want the Khomeini regime simply to collapse and leave a power vacuum that it could not very easily fill. It wanted to tie down Iranian military power, -- much of it provided to the Shah by the United States -- thereby absorbing the revolutionary energy of the Iranians in a conflict that did not threaten any other American interests.

Iraq needed little encouragement to abrogate the 1975 peace treaty that it already considered disadvantageous. Baghdad saw an opportunity; the United States saw a need. The Iraqis believed an attack in the midst of Iranian chaos could gain them a quick victory.

The United States did not think there would be a quick victory, nor did it want one. It wanted a war that would tie down both Iran and Iraq, thus increasing security for the western coast of the Gulf without creating a power vacuum the Soviets could exploit. Finally, an extended war would give the United States enough breathing room to expand and modernize its own forces that had decayed since the final years of the Vietnam War.

Therefore, the United States provided the Iraqis with critical operational elements, from planning to intelligence, in order to defeat the Iranians. There were two pieces to the Iran-Contra crisis: The first was providing money to the Contras in Nicaragua; the second was providing weapons to the Iranians. During the mid-1980s, when it appeared that the Iraqis might be gaining the upper hand, the United States provided assistance to Iran, for complex reasons and under multiple guises. The United States was an equal-opportunity meddler.

The United States' main goal was that no one win the war. It wanted to keep the Soviets out of the region and the Iranians -- and Iraqis -- out of the western coast of the Persian Gulf. The longer the Iran-Iraq war lasted, the better it was for the United States. It was a policy that worked until the war ended. The Soviets did not get to move into a power vacuum. The Iranians did not destabilize the region. And the United States used the time the war bought to improve its power projection capabilities many times over.

Obviously, Saddam was not fighting a war that cost hundreds of thousands of lives merely to gain control over the swamps around the Shatt al-Arab. There had to be a much bigger incentive. All the players knew that whoever won the Iran-Iraq war would become the dominant native power in the Persian Gulf -- and have control over a huge slice of the world's oil supply.

The United States did nothing to undermine the impression that it would support Iraqi claims in the Gulf in return for Iraq's defense of American interests. Indeed, in the last interview between the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait and Saddam, the ambassador gave the distinct impression that the United States had no deep objections to Iraq laying claim to Kuwait. From Saddam's point of view, he was simply claiming what was his as victor. He waged war against Iran in the hopes of controlling the oil of the Persian Gulf.

The United States did nothing to disabuse him of his dream because it needed Iraq to wage the war. During the same period, the United States occasionally supported Iran covertly so as to prevent its collapse. Most important, the United States wanted time to build its forces and prevent Saddam from taking possession of his prize.

The result was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Saddam thought that the United States would not object, but it had no intention of permitting a single country to control Persian Gulf oil. The United States had always been ambiguous in responding to Saddam's claims, stating that it had never endorsed his goals.

Whether it was confusion, double-cross or intended double-cross, the United States was no longer dependent on Iraq and was fully capable of projecting massive forces into the region.

When Saddam moved into Kuwait, the United States deployed to block further advances and recapture the country. As his behavior indicated, Saddam genuinely did not think the Americans would attack. He assumed that since he had cooperated with them, this was merely a "show." He did not realize for a very long time that the United States was really going to -- in his mind -- double-cross him and invade Kuwait.

On the other hand, the core goals of the United States remained intact: Blocking Soviet expansionism had disappeared, but maintaining the independence -- and American domination -- of the Arabian Peninsula remained. The United States could not afford to base a multi-divisional force in the region indefinitely. If Saddam's regime was destroyed, there was a very real possibility that Iraq would disintegrate. That would leave the United States with another nightmare: a hegemonic Iran or a massive U.S. force permanently occupying Iraq in order to block Iran.

Therefore, the United States expelled Saddam from Kuwait but did not attempt to destroy him. A containment strategy was adopted whereby nations surrounding Iraq -- combined with some U.S. forces on the ground, others ready for deployment, and an ongoing air campaign -- limited Saddam's room for maneuver. But the strategy also created a force field within which Saddam could survive. Therefore, the Iranians on Iraq's eastern frontier remained tied down.

Maintaining a balance of power between competing states is an extraordinarily complex matter. The dynamism of the relationship requires the outside, balancing power to constantly shift its weight back and forth in a pattern that appears both devious and inconsistent. How can a nation simultaneously support Iraq and Iran? The inconsistency is reconciled on a deeper level when the goal becomes clear: a permanent balance of power in which the two countries neutralize each other and permit the United States to pursue other interests.

There is nothing new or unknown in the Times article. It was common knowledge that the United States encouraged Iraq to attack Iran. Given the circumstances, with the U.S. hostages, it was the logical thing to do. Having started the war, the United States had to induce the Iraqis to continue it. Promises were made that the United States never intended to keep. Enough support was given Iraq to carry out the war, but if an occasional anti-tank missile found its way into Iran, that also made perfect sense.

It was well known that Saddam was a thug and Khomeini a religious fanatic. But that did not prevent the United States from doing what it had to do. This kind of thing has happened before: People knew Joseph Stalin was a homicidal maniac. Nevertheless, requirements of the balance of power, and the danger posed by Hitler -- another homicidal maniac -- made it imperative that the United States supply arms and materiel to Stalin so that Soviet and German troops could slaughter each other, not Americans. As awful as Saddam might be, Stalin was a hundred times worse. Unless you are prepared to condemn U.S. policy in World War II, it is wise not to be overly critical of U.S. policy in the Gulf.

At the same time, the pursuit of the balance of power has inevitable consequences. Balance of power politics is not an end, but a way of life. Each solution creates a new problem. The Stalin solution to Hitler created the Cold War; the Iraq solution to Iran created the Gulf War.

The New York Times' revelation is as meaningful as would be the "discovery" that some of the aid provided Stalin helped keep the Gulag running. Of course it did -- and some of the aid provided Saddam helped him brutalize his own people. Nevertheless, given the pieces on the table, what was the alternative?

What is most interesting, however, is that the Bush administration seems to have decided that preserving the balance of power between Iraq and Iran is no longer as pre-eminent a concern as it was during the senior Bush's administration. There are a number of possible reasons for this:

The United States no longer cares who dominates the Persian Gulf because Russian oil is going to replace it.
The United States thinks that it can create a stable and powerful Iraq very quickly.
The United States is prepared to leave massive force along the Iranian frontier, directly containing Iran itself.
The United States is so concerned with al Qaeda and Saddam's connection with al Qaeda that it is prepared to pursue this even if it means toppling the regional balance of power.

It could also be any combination of the above or some other insight STRATFOR is missing.

The New York Times has done a service, even if it was not the one intended. There is no "gotcha" in this story -- except for people who weren't looking during the 1980s. What is important here is the striking contrast between the manner in which the United States executed Persian Gulf policy prior to Sept. 11 and the way the Bush administration appears to be pursuing it now. That is the real story.

		Druckversion
	Stratfor.com, Strategic Forecasting \| 20 August 2002 Iraq and the Balance of Power Theory Summary The United States provided intelligence to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, an Aug. 18 New York Times article reported. The article implies that this intelligence sharing should be cause for current embarrassment with an impending war against Iraq. But it was common knowledge that the United States maintained close ties with Iraq during the war, and it must be remembered that events were being played in the context of the Cold War and the U.S.-Iran hostage crisis. Washington played the balance of power game, always the equal-opportunity meddler. The real story here is that maintaining a balance of power between Iran and Iraq no longer appears to be a part of U.S. Persian Gulf policy since Sept. 11. Analysis On Aug. 18, the New York Times published an article stating that the United States had provided Iraq with targeting and other battle management support during its long war with Iran in the 1980s. The story focused on the fact that the United States provided aid to an extremely wicked man who used chemical weapons. The article implies that the United States should be embarrassed for its support of Saddam Hussein. But it was well known both during and after the Iran-Iraq war that the United States had maintained close links with, and had encouraged, Iraq. When the Shah of Iran fell and U.S.-Iranian relations collapsed, the United States sought a means to contain Iran's radical and internationalist Islamic movement. Apart from the inherent animosity between the U.S. and the Ali Khomeini governments, which included the hostage crisis, the United States was afraid that the Iranians would spread their radicalism throughout the region. In particular, it worried that Iran would endanger the "stability" -- also called pro-Americanism -- of the Arab states on the western shore of the Persian Gulf. Iran and Iraq fought an extensive war during the 1970s, using the Kurds as chess pieces. At that time the United States regarded Iran as an ally and saw the war as a means of containing Iraq. For a variety of complex reasons, the United States helped negotiate a peace accord between Iran and Iraq in 1975. By 1980, the problem had changed from controlling Iraqi behavior to controlling Iran. In 1980, the United States had two separate problems. The first was the hostage crisis and the fact that the United States did not have a credible, direct military option. The second was the fear that the Soviet Union would take advantage of what the United States saw as instability in Iran and would strike south to the Persian Gulf. Since air bases in southwestern Afghanistan could provide Soviet aircraft access to Gulf air space, there were military analysts who predicted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the precursor for an attack in the Gulf. The United States did not want the Khomeini regime simply to collapse and leave a power vacuum that it could not very easily fill. It wanted to tie down Iranian military power, -- much of it provided to the Shah by the United States -- thereby absorbing the revolutionary energy of the Iranians in a conflict that did not threaten any other American interests. Iraq needed little encouragement to abrogate the 1975 peace treaty that it already considered disadvantageous. Baghdad saw an opportunity; the United States saw a need. The Iraqis believed an attack in the midst of Iranian chaos could gain them a quick victory. The United States did not think there would be a quick victory, nor did it want one. It wanted a war that would tie down both Iran and Iraq, thus increasing security for the western coast of the Gulf without creating a power vacuum the Soviets could exploit. Finally, an extended war would give the United States enough breathing room to expand and modernize its own forces that had decayed since the final years of the Vietnam War. Therefore, the United States provided the Iraqis with critical operational elements, from planning to intelligence, in order to defeat the Iranians. There were two pieces to the Iran-Contra crisis: The first was providing money to the Contras in Nicaragua; the second was providing weapons to the Iranians. During the mid-1980s, when it appeared that the Iraqis might be gaining the upper hand, the United States provided assistance to Iran, for complex reasons and under multiple guises. The United States was an equal-opportunity meddler. The United States' main goal was that no one win the war. It wanted to keep the Soviets out of the region and the Iranians -- and Iraqis -- out of the western coast of the Persian Gulf. The longer the Iran-Iraq war lasted, the better it was for the United States. It was a policy that worked until the war ended. The Soviets did not get to move into a power vacuum. The Iranians did not destabilize the region. And the United States used the time the war bought to improve its power projection capabilities many times over. Obviously, Saddam was not fighting a war that cost hundreds of thousands of lives merely to gain control over the swamps around the Shatt al-Arab. There had to be a much bigger incentive. All the players knew that whoever won the Iran-Iraq war would become the dominant native power in the Persian Gulf -- and have control over a huge slice of the world's oil supply. The United States did nothing to undermine the impression that it would support Iraqi claims in the Gulf in return for Iraq's defense of American interests. Indeed, in the last interview between the U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait and Saddam, the ambassador gave the distinct impression that the United States had no deep objections to Iraq laying claim to Kuwait. From Saddam's point of view, he was simply claiming what was his as victor. He waged war against Iran in the hopes of controlling the oil of the Persian Gulf. The United States did nothing to disabuse him of his dream because it needed Iraq to wage the war. During the same period, the United States occasionally supported Iran covertly so as to prevent its collapse. Most important, the United States wanted time to build its forces and prevent Saddam from taking possession of his prize. The result was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Saddam thought that the United States would not object, but it had no intention of permitting a single country to control Persian Gulf oil. The United States had always been ambiguous in responding to Saddam's claims, stating that it had never endorsed his goals. Whether it was confusion, double-cross or intended double-cross, the United States was no longer dependent on Iraq and was fully capable of projecting massive forces into the region. When Saddam moved into Kuwait, the United States deployed to block further advances and recapture the country. As his behavior indicated, Saddam genuinely did not think the Americans would attack. He assumed that since he had cooperated with them, this was merely a "show." He did not realize for a very long time that the United States was really going to -- in his mind -- double-cross him and invade Kuwait. On the other hand, the core goals of the United States remained intact: Blocking Soviet expansionism had disappeared, but maintaining the independence -- and American domination -- of the Arabian Peninsula remained. The United States could not afford to base a multi-divisional force in the region indefinitely. If Saddam's regime was destroyed, there was a very real possibility that Iraq would disintegrate. That would leave the United States with another nightmare: a hegemonic Iran or a massive U.S. force permanently occupying Iraq in order to block Iran. Therefore, the United States expelled Saddam from Kuwait but did not attempt to destroy him. A containment strategy was adopted whereby nations surrounding Iraq -- combined with some U.S. forces on the ground, others ready for deployment, and an ongoing air campaign -- limited Saddam's room for maneuver. But the strategy also created a force field within which Saddam could survive. Therefore, the Iranians on Iraq's eastern frontier remained tied down. Maintaining a balance of power between competing states is an extraordinarily complex matter. The dynamism of the relationship requires the outside, balancing power to constantly shift its weight back and forth in a pattern that appears both devious and inconsistent. How can a nation simultaneously support Iraq and Iran? The inconsistency is reconciled on a deeper level when the goal becomes clear: a permanent balance of power in which the two countries neutralize each other and permit the United States to pursue other interests. There is nothing new or unknown in the Times article. It was common knowledge that the United States encouraged Iraq to attack Iran. Given the circumstances, with the U.S. hostages, it was the logical thing to do. Having started the war, the United States had to induce the Iraqis to continue it. Promises were made that the United States never intended to keep. Enough support was given Iraq to carry out the war, but if an occasional anti-tank missile found its way into Iran, that also made perfect sense. It was well known that Saddam was a thug and Khomeini a religious fanatic. But that did not prevent the United States from doing what it had to do. This kind of thing has happened before: People knew Joseph Stalin was a homicidal maniac. Nevertheless, requirements of the balance of power, and the danger posed by Hitler -- another homicidal maniac -- made it imperative that the United States supply arms and materiel to Stalin so that Soviet and German troops could slaughter each other, not Americans. As awful as Saddam might be, Stalin was a hundred times worse. Unless you are prepared to condemn U.S. policy in World War II, it is wise not to be overly critical of U.S. policy in the Gulf. At the same time, the pursuit of the balance of power has inevitable consequences. Balance of power politics is not an end, but a way of life. Each solution creates a new problem. The Stalin solution to Hitler created the Cold War; the Iraq solution to Iran created the Gulf War. The New York Times' revelation is as meaningful as would be the "discovery" that some of the aid provided Stalin helped keep the Gulag running. Of course it did -- and some of the aid provided Saddam helped him brutalize his own people. Nevertheless, given the pieces on the table, what was the alternative? What is most interesting, however, is that the Bush administration seems to have decided that preserving the balance of power between Iraq and Iran is no longer as pre-eminent a concern as it was during the senior Bush's administration. There are a number of possible reasons for this: The United States no longer cares who dominates the Persian Gulf because Russian oil is going to replace it. The United States thinks that it can create a stable and powerful Iraq very quickly. The United States is prepared to leave massive force along the Iranian frontier, directly containing Iran itself. The United States is so concerned with al Qaeda and Saddam's connection with al Qaeda that it is prepared to pursue this even if it means toppling the regional balance of power. It could also be any combination of the above or some other insight STRATFOR is missing. The New York Times has done a service, even if it was not the one intended. There is no "gotcha" in this story -- except for people who weren't looking during the 1980s. What is important here is the striking contrast between the manner in which the United States executed Persian Gulf policy prior to Sept. 11 and the way the Bush administration appears to be pursuing it now. That is the real story. WADI e.V. \| tel.: (+49) 069-57002440 \| fax (+49) 069-57002444 http://www.wadinet.de \| e-mail: