


*Iraq: Two-State Solution?
Or Two Units Solution!*



*Clear-cut
Decision
Pending*

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Iraq:

Clear-cut Decision Pending

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Citation from **Part 2:**

“Change will take time; it should therefore be viewed as a step by step process.
History will again be both: optional and time-consuming.”

Clear-cut Decision Pending

Crawford, February 2007

1. Recent Talk at Crawford on Iraq

“You’ll have to follow through with your Iraq policy, Mr. President. May I explain to you what’s on my mind, Sir.” – “What do you mean?” – “Thank you, Sir. It’s one short sentence: You can’t stop half-way and have success!” – “What do you mean?” – “You’ll have to allow for a 2-Units-Iraq.” – “Again, what do you mean?”

I was surprised that he took time to listen to a low-level guy from outside, even showing interest in what I might say. In a fraction of a second I recalled what a German-Canadian friend of mine once said: “George Bush has the ability to listen to people, more than many of these politicians.” At the time, I dismissed that or wasn’t sure.

- **Two Units**

“Shiites and Sunnis will have to be separated. You can’t police them if they don’t live up to their own responsibility.” – “Well, that’s why I gave orders to the troops, to get this straight.” – “Yes, Sir, but that’s something to be dealt with by politicians. Two distinct units must be set up within Iraq to give each side its own sphere of responsibility.” – “Why two? There are Kurds and others too.” – “Shiites, that’s more than half of Iraqi populace, would constitute one unit. The other will comprise Kurds and Sunnis. Baghdad and its surroundings, airport et cetera, would be ‘common ground’ to Iraqis, considered a central region of its own.”

“That’s inconsequential! You’d have to split Baghdad as well.” – “Yes Sir, it’d be subdivided into ‘zones’, administrative zones, which wouldn’t be formal political ‘units’, however.” – “It’s formalities you are talking about, am I right?” – “I don’t think so, Sir. Delineating responsibility within Baghdad and Iraq – while choosing a flexible setup like the one I indicated – would give Iraqis future room for political maneuvering and self-determination and – for now – would give them accountability.” – “Well, you wrote about it. They gave me an abstract of it, and I glanced at it, briefly. Let’s talk about the *political* implications, not just *organizational* aspects.” [the abstract just mentioned is reported in: “Short Excerpt, Hopefully Reviewed in Washington”, see below, **Part 2**]

- **Rapidly Changing Strategic Setup**

“Thank you, Sir. May I start pointing to the advantages of a 2Unit-Iraq. There are almost no disadvantages!” – “Go ahead. We’ve been looking into that option too, starting last year, but found more questions than answers.” – “Mr. President, at the time I was skeptical too, however, things have been changing rapidly and fundamentally since then. Obviously, there is growing readiness on the part of the Sunni Arab regimes to resist Iranian threats throughout the Mideast theatre. If I may speculate, this isn’t far from assessments of your administration. You yourself have sparked much of the diplomacy going on, directed at Arab partners. They too – the Saudis and Mubarak – are delivering now.” – “And why does this make for a ‘2Unit-Iraq’-rationale, as you say?”

- **Kurds and Sunnis**

“My belief is that Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis could *now*, just because of these changes and new developments, settle on an *alliance*, a very *pragmatic* alliance, eventually setting up a necessary *framework* for such an alliance. By that I mean the *formation of an operative ‘unit’* capable of managing respective interests in consensual, effective, and continual ways within the greater framework of Iraq.” – “So we’d end up with two units, one Sunni and Kurdish, one Shiite? Now what’s the advantage of that?” – “Iraq would *not be balkanized*. Two about equally sized units, self-reliant and certainly eager to manage things by themselves, would emerge and replace the presently amorph, very unmanageable state of affairs. This, for certain, would take pressure off US-troops.”

“That’d be fine, of course, but would Sunnis and Kurds really act rationally and compromise?” – “Why not find out? They are dependent upon each other, as I showed up in my writings. And as can be expected, they’ll get the support of Arab regimes from outside. Also, Turkey wouldn’t be tempted as much as is the case now to press or invade neighboring Kurdish Iraqi places. In view of unforeseeable developments at Kirkuk, when population and oil claims will have to be settled at the end of this year, there is need to already have in place working, robust relations between Kurds and Sunnis.”

- **Shiites**

“How about the Shiites? Handing them over to the Iranians doesn’t seem a good option to me.” – “Yes Sir, there would be enhanced influence by the Iranians, however, there might also be limits to this. Shiites in Southern and Central Irak don’t just want to take orders from Tehran. Also the

Iraqi Shiite clergy won't just bow to their colleagues in Iran for the mere reason that their fellow mullahs sit in a bigger country and own more worldly weapons.” – “Okay, but would dissent be strong or widespread and would the means to withstand pressure be sufficient for Iraqi Shiites to thwart Iranian subversion or dictates?” – “If not, they might still ask US-troops stationed in Iraq to counterbalance some of the pressure and keep supporting them in one way or another. Looking at the abundant potential for dissent between a more secularized ruling elite in Iraq and the kind established in Iran, it can't be ruled out that some delicate nuanced Shiite-US co-operation might over time develop if Iranians would press their Iraqi fellow Shiites unduly.” – “Well, that's only a vague hope!” – “Yes Sir, however, as a 'unit' inside Iraq, not a 'state', Shiite territory will not be at the mere disposal of the regime next door.”

“Well, it's been worthwhile talking. I'll have my staff go through the various arguments put forth in favor of a 2Unit-Iraq once again.” – “Thank you, Sir. It's been an honor and a great pleasure to speak out here. May I take the chance to ask you to please give my heartfelt thanks to your father for clearing the way for reunification of my country?” – “I will, and I like to add, it might help as well if your country will back constructive solutions in Iraq and elsewhere.” [see: “Final Remarks, Relating to Talk at Crawford”, **Part 3**]

Iraqi Shiite clergy won't just bow to their colleagues in Iran for the mere reason that their fellow mullahs sit in a bigger country or dispose of more worldly weapons.

2. Short Excerpt, Hopefully Reviewed in Washington

It's a matter of time when Iraq will be partitioned. A Two Units solution would avoid an abrupt split and preserve all options for future rational, self-determined decision-making by Iraqis. A Two-Unit Solution is not to be confused with a Two-State Solution. “Units” as discussed here are meant to be parts of Iraq. Change will take time; it should therefore be viewed as a step by step process. History will again be both: Optional and time-consuming.

Setting up a *Two-Unit-Iraq* may as well lead to a Two-State solution as to a recentralized country. That would be a much later phase – *for now*, this would de-escalate sectarian strife, restrain terrorist activity, and inspire more *political leadership* by Iraqis in their respective parts of the country. Setting up two units will establish a clearly defined frame for *regional accountability* and will indeed make this much called-for concept (of accountability) *a meaningful reality*. To Iraqis and US-troops it would finally make for a win-win-situation.

- **Political Model of Accountability**

It is generally agreed that there must be a security solution backed militarily as well as politically if progress is to be achieved in Iraq. The contours of a future internal state of affairs capable of stabilizing Iraq would most probably have to be based on an *alliance* between Kurds and Sunnis and a *2Unit-model* for Iraq. The restructuring of Iraq along these lines giving Shiites control of their part – “unit” – of the country and forging another unit where Kurds and Sunnis exert control would render all the authority and responsibility necessary on each side to quell much of the criminal and terrorist activities. It might give each side the utter determination needed to fight back against nihilism within its own sphere of influence – or fail as a community and society.

Change will take time and should therefore be viewed as a step by step process. History will again be both: optional and time-consuming.

- **GBR – Greater Baghdad Region**

Baghdad and its immediate surroundings would be “common ground” to Iraqis, considered a central region of its own. Though a “joint unit” or region, it would still have to be subdivided mostly along ethnic lines into two or maybe more zones (to ensure accountability). The Central Government presently in office would stay where it resides now but would only deal with issues of national relevance that can’t be dealt with regionally in an efficient way. Of course, it would have some say in security measures within the limits of the Baghdad region [see below, **Part 4**]. US-troops would help control Baghdad and also such spots or parts of the country posing threats beyond a mere local scope – in principle, they would balance out deficiencies of regional forces and keep training them. There would be less need and effort to invigorate Iraqi forces for within its boundaries each region (or unit) will impose its control with added determination. US-troops would thus be better positioned to focus or refocus their efforts.

- **What about Tehran?**

The advantage of a 2Unit-Iraq would be on all sides, except for the Iranian regime! That’s exactly why the latter would even accept talk (and maybe compromise) on crucial issues the very moment a *2Unit-plan* were put forth – just to crisscross probable success of such a plan. It’s likely that a 2Unit-setup will prove to be highly disquieting for Tehran [s. below, **Part 4**].

A 2Unit-setup will be highly disquieting to Tehran.

- **Kurds and Sunnis**

Kurds and Sunnis are mutually dependent upon each other especially with regard to oil wells and corresponding transportation lines to foreign customers – who will have to be the ones to finance economical and societal development in Iraq. The very essence of what is needed along Kurdish-Sunni lines isn't much more than an unpretentious but steady increase of all kinds of day-to-day co-operation with mutual advantage to both sides. It's that plain, it's not at all political ideology. Acceptance on the part of Sunnis and Kurds to cooperate in a common "unit" leaves sufficient room for self-government on each side. Kurds would not govern Sunnis nor would the latter be entitled to govern the former. Neither side could be subdued by the other – as had been the case with the Kurds by Saddam and the Sunni Baath regime. Their respective size and "strength" or "weight" doesn't differ much or will balance out. There need not be fear of one another.

- **Let's Help Turkey**

Turkey would be tempted far less to adopt aggressive steps towards its Kurdish Iraqi neighbor if Kurds and Sunnis form a "unit", with the Arab regimes backing this alliance. For strategic reasons (confronting Iran) and for Pan-Arabic reasons Arab regimes will no doubt welcome and sponsor this alliance – as well as the necessary framework of any such alliance, i.e. formation of an operative "unit" capable of managing (reconciling/balancing) respective interests in consensual, effective, and continual ways.

Pragmatic co-operation of Kurds and Sunnis would fend off balkanization and thwart aggression from the outside. Formation of an operative "unit" capable of managing (reconciling and balancing) respective interests in consensual, effective, and continual ways, provides a stable set for any such co-operation.

- **Shiites**

Last not least, the Shiites will profit by forming a "unit" of their own though it may prove to be a calamity for them defining *their* goals and course of action vis-à-vis IRAQ, IRAN, Arab neighbors or Sunni populace within their parts of the country, or, for instance, defining the scope and role of secular government given the pretense of religion and mullah authorities. It might propel a process of political shaping and learning and maybe of distancing themselves discretely from an awkward political role-model like Iran's mullah autocracy.

3. Final Remarks, Relating to Talk at Crawford

It has not been stated that this conversation really took place, nor do we insist that it didn't, or that it couldn't have taken precisely this course. The suggestions made above ought to be taken into consideration. Setting up two politico-administrative units within Iraq, thereby limiting the reach and responsibility of the respective political forces involved on each side, *would reduce the complexities of the situation significantly, while at the same time enhancing (e.g. visualizing, materializing) accountability.* Separating the main foes would reduce tensions immediately, if only to some degree. The allied military would be disburdened in part and could refocus efforts, giving far more emphasis to reconstruction.

Setting up a 2Unit model within Iraq would reduce the complexity of the situation greatly, while at the same time enhancing accountability.

4. Additional Titles

Petraeus will win if 2Unit-Iraq is set up

www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/1313_Petraeus-will-win-if-2Unit-Iraq-is-set-up.pdf

Zweiteilung als Chance

www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/1299_Iraq-Two-Units-or-Two-State-Solution.pdf

Chancen einer Allianz zwischen kurdischen und sunnitischen Landesteilen

www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/1290_Iraq-Winning-Political-Strategy-Part-1.pdf

Völkerrechtsthema Irak – Thema mit Substanz?

www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/Irak-und-das-Voelkerrecht.pdf

The Need to Constrain Iran Effectively

www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=13414&topicID=44

Iran-Konflikt: Ausblick auf die kommende Debatte

www.wadinet.de/news/dokus/474_Iran_Ausblick-auf-die-kommende-Debatte.pdf