The Kurds have a right to separate from Iraq

Dr. Kanan Makiya, born in Baghdad, is perhaps the world's most well-known Iraqi dissident author. He is a tireless voice for freedom and human rights in Iraq. His works include Republic of Fear, the definitive investigation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, The Monument, and Cruelty and Silence, winner of the 1993 Lionel Gelber Award for the Best Book on International Relations. His most recent work, The Rock: A Tale of Seventh-Century Jerusalem, has just appeared in stores. On Saturday, December 15, 2001, Dr. Makiya was interviewed by KurdishMedia.com reporter Jeff Klein. He answered questions concerning the future of Iraq and the Kurdish issue within Iraq.

JK: There has been much talk and speculation that Iraq could be the target of a second phase of the present American-led campaign against terrorism. Do you think that Iraq will be attacked, and, if so, do you think that Saddam Hussein will be removed from power?

KM: I don't think that anyone knows the answer to that question; whether or not Iraq will be attacked in phase two. Certainly it is a question under intense debate at the moment inside the American administration, with those who are arguing for that course of action and those who are opposed to it. It is not clear exactly how that debate will end. In regards to how the regime might fair in the event of attacks, I think if there is a concerted American will to depose it, working through and with the Iraqi opposition, which is what I think should happen, then I think there is simply no doubt at all that the regime will fall.

JK: Do you think the United States is committed to removing Saddam Hussein from power, or do you think that 1991 could repeat itself and Saddam Hussein could survive yet another massive American-led military campaign?

KM: I think there is one big difference between 1991 and the present moment, namely, that today, if the United States makes a decision to engage in military action against Iraq, it will, I suspect, finish the job, which it didn't do, of course, in 1991. That is because the whole legacy of the last ten years has deeply divided the American administration. All Washington think tanks and many congressmen, senators, and civil servants in the administration believe that his continued presence, ten years now after the Gulf War, represents a major defeat for the United States. Let's not forget that the United States won a war in 1991, a dramatic military victory, but ten years down the line that has translated into essentially a political defeat in the Middle East. Saddam is still there, his poison is spreading its way through the region, his fortunes tends to rise when those of the Arab-Israeli peace process decline, and there is a connection between those two things. He is unreformable, the regime is unreformable, and I think this is now clearly understood in Washington, so it's a matter of whether the United States decides to continue this failed policy of containing him, keeping him in a box of some sort, clipping his wings whenever he reaches outward, or acts to remove him. But I think, as I said before, that this question is not sorted out. There are those in Washington who fear the ramifications on the rest of the Middle East if that happens, and who fear the consequences and think that would lead to the division of Iraq into many states and would cause even more chaos in the region. That is the main issue of debate at the moment.

JK: What do you see as the most possible scenario for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq? Do you think it is likely that Iraq would disintegrate into 2 or 3 separate states, or do you see a unified, multi-ethnic government or perhaps some sort of democratic coalition taking power?

KM: Certainly the latter is what I would look forward to, what I would argue for, and what I have spent years of my life fighting for. It much depends on how the regime changes, if the regime changes by a palace coup, if the regime changes by a concerted action in which the United States is involved, if federal forces of the Iraqi opposition—I am thinking here of the umbrella organization of the Iraqi National Congress—are the instrument of change, or if other organizations are the instrument. I fear very much that the United States will once again try to repeat the disastrous strategy it followed in 1996, when it supported a military coup from the center, and that might just lead to a change from one set of Ba'athist faces to another and no real substantial change in the structure or nature of the regime. That would be a terrible outcome.

JK: Why do you think that there has been no real Arab support outside of Iraq expressed for the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein?

KM: Because I think the countries surrounding Iraq in the region fear the consequences of a federal, democratic Iraq, and such a regime would immediately become an exemplary model in the region and lead to a deep questioning and undermining of the authority of regimes like Saudi Arabia and so on. I think that is what they fear the most.

JK: You have studied the Kurdish issue and the Anfal atrocity. In light of your studies, do you think that the Kurds, having already achieved an autonomous zone outside of Arab control, should be expected to unite with Iraqi Arabs and support a unified Iraq in which they would again be a minority?

KM: That is a decision that only the Kurds should make; no Arab and no other force should impose it on them. They should make that decision amongst themselves, and certainly the rest of Iraq should accept whatever decision the Kurds come to on this. However, that having been said, my own view is that it is perhaps in the best interests of Iraqi Kurds themselves to be the spearhead, the vanguard of change in Iraq. In other words, to write the constitution in their own image, so to speak. The dangers of splitting up Iraq are real, and it could very well lead to further splits and divisions and, as we already saw in the infighting that occurred among the Kurds themselves in 1994, it could lead to fights within Kurdistan, and between the Kurds and Turkmens and other minority groups. So in general, I do not support ethnic states, that is not my formal position, but it is a decision for the Kurds to make, and I would argue that if they do play a major role in the change of regime in Iraq, they then have, of course, a very large role in the shaping of the new state and the making of its federal and democratic structure.

JK: Do you think that Iraq's Kurds have a legitimate right to separate from Iraq and demand independence?

KM: They do, but I hope they don't exercise that right. Speaking here just personally as Kanan Makiya, I would argue with them not to do that, for their sake and mine. I don't want to lose them because I stand to benefit from their presence as an Iraqi Arab in a state in which they are also in, and I think they stand to benefit in a state in which I am in. So for that reason, I would try to convince them not to, but if they insist that they want to and that is what they want to do after all that has happened to them, I certainly would not stand in their way.

JK: Do you think that an independent Kurdish state either in Iraq or spreading over present national borders will eventually come about?

KM: This is pure speculation, but it depends on many dynamics. Certainly we know that all the surrounding regimes, Turkey, Iran, are all bitterly against it. Only recently, Massoud Barzani made a statement saying that the reason he doesn't want to separate is because he knows that these surrounding states are so bitterly against it. The Turks would fight it tooth and nail. But that is just one factor. I don't base my position on the nefarious needs of such regimes to repress their own Kurdish populations. I say that the Kurds have a right to separate if that is what they want, but it might be in their best interests not to do so. But that is a different argument altogether, it is an argument based on what is in Kurdish self-interest, not what is in Turkish, Iranian, or Arab self-interest.

JK: And do you think that the United States would be interested in the establishment of a Kurdish state in southern, or Iraqi, Kurdistan?

KM: At the moment the position is very clear. No. They are against it. Their NATO ally Turkey is against it and they are against it as well. That has been the official American position for as long as I know.

	HOME \| NEWS \| Irak-Debatte	Druckversion
	22.12.2001 \| KurdishMedia.com \| by Jeff Klein The Kurds have a right to separate from Iraq Dr. Kanan Makiya, born in Baghdad, is perhaps the world's most well-known Iraqi dissident author. He is a tireless voice for freedom and human rights in Iraq. His works include Republic of Fear, the definitive investigation of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, The Monument, and Cruelty and Silence, winner of the 1993 Lionel Gelber Award for the Best Book on International Relations. His most recent work, The Rock: A Tale of Seventh-Century Jerusalem, has just appeared in stores. On Saturday, December 15, 2001, Dr. Makiya was interviewed by KurdishMedia.com reporter Jeff Klein. He answered questions concerning the future of Iraq and the Kurdish issue within Iraq. JK: There has been much talk and speculation that Iraq could be the target of a second phase of the present American-led campaign against terrorism. Do you think that Iraq will be attacked, and, if so, do you think that Saddam Hussein will be removed from power? KM: I don't think that anyone knows the answer to that question; whether or not Iraq will be attacked in phase two. Certainly it is a question under intense debate at the moment inside the American administration, with those who are arguing for that course of action and those who are opposed to it. It is not clear exactly how that debate will end. In regards to how the regime might fair in the event of attacks, I think if there is a concerted American will to depose it, working through and with the Iraqi opposition, which is what I think should happen, then I think there is simply no doubt at all that the regime will fall. JK: Do you think the United States is committed to removing Saddam Hussein from power, or do you think that 1991 could repeat itself and Saddam Hussein could survive yet another massive American-led military campaign? KM: I think there is one big difference between 1991 and the present moment, namely, that today, if the United States makes a decision to engage in military action against Iraq, it will, I suspect, finish the job, which it didn't do, of course, in 1991. That is because the whole legacy of the last ten years has deeply divided the American administration. All Washington think tanks and many congressmen, senators, and civil servants in the administration believe that his continued presence, ten years now after the Gulf War, represents a major defeat for the United States. Let's not forget that the United States won a war in 1991, a dramatic military victory, but ten years down the line that has translated into essentially a political defeat in the Middle East. Saddam is still there, his poison is spreading its way through the region, his fortunes tends to rise when those of the Arab-Israeli peace process decline, and there is a connection between those two things. He is unreformable, the regime is unreformable, and I think this is now clearly understood in Washington, so it's a matter of whether the United States decides to continue this failed policy of containing him, keeping him in a box of some sort, clipping his wings whenever he reaches outward, or acts to remove him. But I think, as I said before, that this question is not sorted out. There are those in Washington who fear the ramifications on the rest of the Middle East if that happens, and who fear the consequences and think that would lead to the division of Iraq into many states and would cause even more chaos in the region. That is the main issue of debate at the moment. JK: What do you see as the most possible scenario for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq? Do you think it is likely that Iraq would disintegrate into 2 or 3 separate states, or do you see a unified, multi-ethnic government or perhaps some sort of democratic coalition taking power? KM: Certainly the latter is what I would look forward to, what I would argue for, and what I have spent years of my life fighting for. It much depends on how the regime changes, if the regime changes by a palace coup, if the regime changes by a concerted action in which the United States is involved, if federal forces of the Iraqi opposition—I am thinking here of the umbrella organization of the Iraqi National Congress—are the instrument of change, or if other organizations are the instrument. I fear very much that the United States will once again try to repeat the disastrous strategy it followed in 1996, when it supported a military coup from the center, and that might just lead to a change from one set of Ba'athist faces to another and no real substantial change in the structure or nature of the regime. That would be a terrible outcome. JK: Why do you think that there has been no real Arab support outside of Iraq expressed for the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein? KM: Because I think the countries surrounding Iraq in the region fear the consequences of a federal, democratic Iraq, and such a regime would immediately become an exemplary model in the region and lead to a deep questioning and undermining of the authority of regimes like Saudi Arabia and so on. I think that is what they fear the most. JK: You have studied the Kurdish issue and the Anfal atrocity. In light of your studies, do you think that the Kurds, having already achieved an autonomous zone outside of Arab control, should be expected to unite with Iraqi Arabs and support a unified Iraq in which they would again be a minority? KM: That is a decision that only the Kurds should make; no Arab and no other force should impose it on them. They should make that decision amongst themselves, and certainly the rest of Iraq should accept whatever decision the Kurds come to on this. However, that having been said, my own view is that it is perhaps in the best interests of Iraqi Kurds themselves to be the spearhead, the vanguard of change in Iraq. In other words, to write the constitution in their own image, so to speak. The dangers of splitting up Iraq are real, and it could very well lead to further splits and divisions and, as we already saw in the infighting that occurred among the Kurds themselves in 1994, it could lead to fights within Kurdistan, and between the Kurds and Turkmens and other minority groups. So in general, I do not support ethnic states, that is not my formal position, but it is a decision for the Kurds to make, and I would argue that if they do play a major role in the change of regime in Iraq, they then have, of course, a very large role in the shaping of the new state and the making of its federal and democratic structure. JK: Do you think that Iraq's Kurds have a legitimate right to separate from Iraq and demand independence? KM: They do, but I hope they don't exercise that right. Speaking here just personally as Kanan Makiya, I would argue with them not to do that, for their sake and mine. I don't want to lose them because I stand to benefit from their presence as an Iraqi Arab in a state in which they are also in, and I think they stand to benefit in a state in which I am in. So for that reason, I would try to convince them not to, but if they insist that they want to and that is what they want to do after all that has happened to them, I certainly would not stand in their way. JK: Do you think that an independent Kurdish state either in Iraq or spreading over present national borders will eventually come about? KM: This is pure speculation, but it depends on many dynamics. Certainly we know that all the surrounding regimes, Turkey, Iran, are all bitterly against it. Only recently, Massoud Barzani made a statement saying that the reason he doesn't want to separate is because he knows that these surrounding states are so bitterly against it. The Turks would fight it tooth and nail. But that is just one factor. I don't base my position on the nefarious needs of such regimes to repress their own Kurdish populations. I say that the Kurds have a right to separate if that is what they want, but it might be in their best interests not to do so. But that is a different argument altogether, it is an argument based on what is in Kurdish self-interest, not what is in Turkish, Iranian, or Arab self-interest. JK: And do you think that the United States would be interested in the establishment of a Kurdish state in southern, or Iraqi, Kurdistan? KM: At the moment the position is very clear. No. They are against it. Their NATO ally Turkey is against it and they are against it as well. That has been the official American position for as long as I know. 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