The case for tough action against Iraq

David Rose argues that the West is paying the price for mistakes made 10 years ago

It makes little difference whether you like your foreign policy driven mainly by ethics or by cynicism - the decisions made by the Western-led coalition at the end of the Gulf war in 1991 were a catastrophe.

Now, as the United States and its European allies argue over extending the 'war on terrorism' to Iraq, the doves are using the arguments they deployed 10 years ago. They were wrong then, and they are wrong now.

In 1991, the Shia of the South and the Kurds of the North answered George Bush Snr's call to 'remove the dictator, Saddam Hussein,' by seizing cities and much of the country with breathtaking ease.

Washington had already allowed Iraq's best troops, the Republican Guard, to exit the Kuwait battlefront unscathed. Now, far from providing the support the rebels had expected, the US told Iraq it had 'no objection' if it wished to fly its gunships. Saddam used these forces to massacre tens of thousands of civilians, while US planes studded the sky overhead. This was connivance in mass murder.

The West had decided to stick with the devil it knew, and tried, through UN nuclear, biological and chemical weapons inspectors, to contain him.

A decade later, the sequel unfolds. There is no evidence of Iraqi involvement in the atrocities of 11 September, say the doves, and therefore no legal basis for hostile action. (In fact, as The Observer reported earlier this month, there is more evidence of contact between Iraqi intelligence officers and the 19 hijackers than there is of their personal involvement with al Qaeda.) Iraq, it is claimed, is no longer a threat to the West or the Middle East. Attacking it would end Arab support for the anti-terrorist coalition, and risk a fundamentalist firestorm from Islamabad to the Mediterranean.

These arguments are questionable. Saddam asserts that he no longer has an interest in developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. However, he made identical claims time and again before 1998, while taking steps to conceal vast stockpiles of biological agents and nerve gas, and a nuclear programme which was close to success.

Meanwhile, there is clear evidence that Iraq has trained hundreds of terrorists in hijacking, sabotage and murder. How are these 'not a threat'? As for the coalition, while in 1991 several Arab countries deployed troops, their support this time does seem more tenuous. The public pasting given to Blair by President Assad of Syria suggests its value is limited.

In an article in Friday's Daily Mail , the academic Mark Almond described the thinking which underpins the Iraqi quietists' position. For our friends in Damascus, Riyadh and the Emirates, 'the overriding nightmare is that America would impose Western-style democracy on the region, starting with post-Saddam Iraq.'

This classification of democracy as a 'nightmare' has precedents. For most of the Cold War, Latin America either languished under pro-Western, murderous fascist autocracies or endured insurgency from murderous pro-Western guerrillas. Democracy, the Western foreign policy experts argued, was too good for the Hispanics. Today, most of the continent is relatively democratic, with an absence of death squads and political prisons.

We need to make an analogous paradigm shift in policy towards Iraq and the Islamic world. Democracy is not too good for Arabs and Muslims, either, and Iraq, with a long secular tradition, and a big, well-educated middle class, ought to be an ideal place to establish a bridgehead. Haltingly, step by step, its neighbour Iran is already moving of its own accord in the same direction. Making that shift helps to determine what we should do. The answer is not the military coup pursued with futility by the CIA throughout the 1990s; nor the replacing of one tyrant with another. Nor is it to pick a fight over the refusal to allow renewed weapons inspections, to bomb heavily yet again and then withdraw. It is to support democratic forces which already exist, in the shape of the Iraqi National Congress.

The foreign policy Arabists have briefed the media that the INC is a disorganised, divided rabble. In fact, it is supported by the overwhelming majority of Iraq's liberals and intellectuals, and has become by far the best source of information on what is actually happening there.

This support must and will include military force. And once committed, it must, unlike in 1991, be maintained. Last week, in a safe house in the Middle East, I spoke to a recent defector who had been very high in one of the organs of repression in Saddam's 'republic of fear'. 'If the Iraqi people realise that this time the West is seriously targeting the regime, even the supposedly most loyal security and military units will run away,' he said. 'No one wants a rerun of 1991. Just drop some bombs on his palaces so we know you mean business. It will take days.' There are occasions in history when the use of force is both right and sensible. This is one of them.

	HOME \| NEWS \| Irak-Debatte	Druckversion
	2.12.2001 \| The Observer The case for tough action against Iraq David Rose argues that the West is paying the price for mistakes made 10 years ago It makes little difference whether you like your foreign policy driven mainly by ethics or by cynicism - the decisions made by the Western-led coalition at the end of the Gulf war in 1991 were a catastrophe. Now, as the United States and its European allies argue over extending the 'war on terrorism' to Iraq, the doves are using the arguments they deployed 10 years ago. They were wrong then, and they are wrong now. In 1991, the Shia of the South and the Kurds of the North answered George Bush Snr's call to 'remove the dictator, Saddam Hussein,' by seizing cities and much of the country with breathtaking ease. Washington had already allowed Iraq's best troops, the Republican Guard, to exit the Kuwait battlefront unscathed. Now, far from providing the support the rebels had expected, the US told Iraq it had 'no objection' if it wished to fly its gunships. Saddam used these forces to massacre tens of thousands of civilians, while US planes studded the sky overhead. This was connivance in mass murder. The West had decided to stick with the devil it knew, and tried, through UN nuclear, biological and chemical weapons inspectors, to contain him. A decade later, the sequel unfolds. There is no evidence of Iraqi involvement in the atrocities of 11 September, say the doves, and therefore no legal basis for hostile action. (In fact, as The Observer reported earlier this month, there is more evidence of contact between Iraqi intelligence officers and the 19 hijackers than there is of their personal involvement with al Qaeda.) Iraq, it is claimed, is no longer a threat to the West or the Middle East. Attacking it would end Arab support for the anti-terrorist coalition, and risk a fundamentalist firestorm from Islamabad to the Mediterranean. These arguments are questionable. Saddam asserts that he no longer has an interest in developing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. However, he made identical claims time and again before 1998, while taking steps to conceal vast stockpiles of biological agents and nerve gas, and a nuclear programme which was close to success. Meanwhile, there is clear evidence that Iraq has trained hundreds of terrorists in hijacking, sabotage and murder. How are these 'not a threat'? As for the coalition, while in 1991 several Arab countries deployed troops, their support this time does seem more tenuous. The public pasting given to Blair by President Assad of Syria suggests its value is limited. In an article in Friday's Daily Mail , the academic Mark Almond described the thinking which underpins the Iraqi quietists' position. For our friends in Damascus, Riyadh and the Emirates, 'the overriding nightmare is that America would impose Western-style democracy on the region, starting with post-Saddam Iraq.' This classification of democracy as a 'nightmare' has precedents. For most of the Cold War, Latin America either languished under pro-Western, murderous fascist autocracies or endured insurgency from murderous pro-Western guerrillas. Democracy, the Western foreign policy experts argued, was too good for the Hispanics. Today, most of the continent is relatively democratic, with an absence of death squads and political prisons. We need to make an analogous paradigm shift in policy towards Iraq and the Islamic world. Democracy is not too good for Arabs and Muslims, either, and Iraq, with a long secular tradition, and a big, well-educated middle class, ought to be an ideal place to establish a bridgehead. Haltingly, step by step, its neighbour Iran is already moving of its own accord in the same direction. Making that shift helps to determine what we should do. The answer is not the military coup pursued with futility by the CIA throughout the 1990s; nor the replacing of one tyrant with another. Nor is it to pick a fight over the refusal to allow renewed weapons inspections, to bomb heavily yet again and then withdraw. It is to support democratic forces which already exist, in the shape of the Iraqi National Congress. The foreign policy Arabists have briefed the media that the INC is a disorganised, divided rabble. In fact, it is supported by the overwhelming majority of Iraq's liberals and intellectuals, and has become by far the best source of information on what is actually happening there. This support must and will include military force. And once committed, it must, unlike in 1991, be maintained. Last week, in a safe house in the Middle East, I spoke to a recent defector who had been very high in one of the organs of repression in Saddam's 'republic of fear'. 'If the Iraqi people realise that this time the West is seriously targeting the regime, even the supposedly most loyal security and military units will run away,' he said. 'No one wants a rerun of 1991. Just drop some bombs on his palaces so we know you mean business. It will take days.' There are occasions in history when the use of force is both right and sensible. This is one of them. WADI e.V. \| tel.: (+49) 069-57002440 \| fax (+49) 069-57002444 http://www.wadinet.de \| e-mail: