WADIblog

Debka fasst die Kritik in Israel an der gestrigen Erstürmung zusammen und erklärt, warum eine Seeblockade Gazas für israelische Sicherheitsinteressen von existentieller Bedeutung bleibt (oder soll man den Job der ach so erfolgreichen deutschen Bundesmarine überlassen, unter deren Augen die Hizbollah mehr Waffen anhäuft als je zuvor?):

The blockade’s main purpose: Without it, Iranian ships loaded with ballistic missiles would be free to unload their cargoes at Gaza Port - with the same ease as their heavy weapons consignments reach Lebanon. Hamas would quickly grow into a second Hizballah. For Israel, lifting the blockade would be an act of suicide.

(…) Much of (citicicsm) comes from veteran naval officers, who were deeply distressed on three counts:
1. They want the defense minister, who was deeply involved in every detail of the operation, to be accountable for its shortcomings.
2.  They accuse the minister of sending the naval commandos of the elite Shayetet 6 unit into a clearly violent confrontation without adequate means of defense or options in case of violent resistance because he was afraid of international disapproval.
debka file’s military sources quote those officers as maintaining that when the activists on the Turkish Marmara saw that the commandos were virtually tied hand and foot, they were encouraged to extremes of violence. Had they been appropriately equipped, the troops could have quietly taken the helm and diverted the ship to Ashdod and the incident would have ended without loss of life.
3. Hundreds of people milling about on the deck ready to waylay the commandos as they landed were visible from the helicopters before the drops began. A small amount of tear gas would have cleared the decks and enabled the troops to perform their mission cleanly.
4. This was clearly no job for inadequately armed commandos highly trained for different sorts of combat. When Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu returns home Tuesday afternoon, he would do well to back away from mealy-mouthed rhetoric and state clearly in advance that any vessels, civilian or naval, venturing into the 20-nautical mile blockade zone would encounter warning fire first and if it was not heeded, direct fire. Semi-armed soldiers must not be asked to cover for timid politicians.

Siehe auch diesen Artikel von Amos Harel, der ebenfalls darauf hinweist, wie wenig die Soldaten auf solch einen gewalltätigen Angriff vorbereitet waren:

As for the operation itself, the commandos did nothing wrong. They were vastly outnumbered, and apparently prepared only for a disturbance, with limited use of cold weapons. When they descended from their ropes onto the decks, they found themselves amid a violent mob. Sliding down a cable is done wearing asbestos gloves, which make it impossible to operate a weapon. Some soldiers were armed only with paintball rifles.

Moreover, the force lacked the element of surprise, as protesters knew an assault was imminent. We also know by this stage that a critical mass of soldiers did not board the Marmara early enough, and it may be that not enough troops were allocated to begin with. The end result remains the same: The commandos were not prepared to confront such a large, violent crowd. .

Dieser Artikel wurde am Dienstag, 01. Juni 2010 um 9:59 veröffentlicht und ist abgelegt unter Nahost. Du kannst die Antworten zu diesem Artikel mit Hilfe des RSS 2.0 Feeds verfolgen. Du kannst eine Antwort hinterlassen oder einen Trackback von deiner Seite aus senden.