KdI - Koalition demokratischer Irak / Coalition for a democratic Iraq

Iraq Memorandum

1) Premise

Iraqi Opposition and the Transition to Democracy

While the public debate concerning a possible war in Iraq is focused on the question of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the Iraqi opposition has been preparing for months for an event that will be of historic importance for Iraq and the entire region - the fall of Saddam Hussein. Representatives from more than 50 political parties, interest-groups and exile-organizations met in mid December to create a common platform from which a future Iraqi government could be created. The conference was the result of the work of several Iraqi parties, especially the Kurdish KDP and PUK, which were involved in the creation of a framework for the democratic reordering of the country, as well as the work of the Democratic Principles Working Group (DPWG) - a group of around 30 exiled Iraqi scientists in the USA centered around Kanan Makiya, which produced the paper "Transition to Democracy in Iraq" at the invitation of the US Department of State which was discussed at the London conference. Despite the widely held belief that Iraq would disintegrate into ethnic and/or religious entities following the collapse of the current regime, the Iraqi opposition has produced far reaching successes. In their final statement, all of the participants at the London conference - Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites and the representatives of confessional and ethnic minorities - called for the creation of a democratic, pluralistic and federal Iraqi state within the bounds of existing Iraqi borders. This should not be an "Arab" state similar to the one currently ruled by the Ba'th Party, but rather a federal state made up of the two main "nationalities" - the Kurds and Arabs. All minorities should be given far reaching rights, although individual civil rights should be given priority over collective rights. The meaning of this declaration must be seen in the historical context of the Arabian East. For the first time, an opposition, independent of the ethnic or religious composition of the various groups, has squared off against the ruling government of their own country without calling territorial and national composition into question. Yet the conference in London offered another first in the history of the Mashreq; it was the first time the program of an opposition group was not directed against the USA and the West, but actively included the participation of the USA and Great Britain. On or around February 20 (the exact date cannot be determined due to problematic entry situation) the transitional committee - created at the London conference - and its 65 members (plus ten members representing the Faili Kurds who were not represented at the London conference) will meet to transform the principles decided in London into concrete organizational structures.

Arab Middle East

Should this unprecedented undertaking succeed, it would not only redefine the composition of Iraq, it could also provide a model for other Arab countries in desperate need of political and social reform. In its Human Development Reports on the region, UNDP has stated a steady decline in all areas of economic and social development, while at the same time there has been no fundamental change in the form of government nor even a change in leadership for the past 30 years (with the exception of Yemen and the Sudan). The Mashreq remains, regardless of its vast natural resources, underdeveloped and apparently incapable of reform in its current composition. Internal problems are routinely blamed on external forces - Israel, Zionism or US Imperialism. Opposing or reformist ideas are routinely denounced as subversive. Members of the opposition are persecuted as they are considered agents of Zionism. Yet the Iraqi opposition is on the point of breaking through this vicious circle. This aspect of the conflict, which has received little attention in Germany, is not only wrought with dangers. It carries with it the possibility of democratic development in the region which is in the direct interest of Germany and the European Union - a change which could prove the much touted "domino effect" to be nothing more than an overdue "short-circuit" in Arab governments which could delegitamize the institutions of dictatorial rule and, at the very least, force democratic reforms. A structural change in the governments of the Mashreq states would also be in agreement with the (in Europe all to carelessly expressed) point of view, that the origins of Islamist terror lies in underdevelopment and undemocratic conditions.

Iraq in the Near Future

It seems highly improbable that the government of Saddam Hussein can remain in power for the long term even without the expected military action against Iraq. It enjoys little regional and international legitimacy and has shown itself either unwilling or unable to cooperate with the international community. There have also been no real signs that the human rights situation has improved, nor has there been any effort to raise the standard of living among the population. The transitional period of the embargo-government under the conditions valid since 1991 is so fundamentally questioned that a returm to the previous status quo seems impossible. A non-military solution to the conflict whereby the Iraqi government would remain in power - which would have to be accompanied by both the extremely improbable statement of compliance from the United Nations and the UNMOVIC as well as the thorough compliance from the Iraqi leadership - would require a solution to problems beyond the question of arms control which, as experience has shown, will not be forthcoming without further escalation on behalf of the Iraqi regime. One of the most important questions is the status of Kurdish northern Iraq which is of primary importance for the Iraqi opposition. Neither the Kurds nor the Shiites, both having suffered significant repression in the years past, would sit back and allow the rehabilitation of the current regime. A rehabilitation of the Ba'th regime either with or without Hussein (and it does not seem probable that Hussein will choose to retreat into exile) would be neither in the interest of the people of Iraq (who, as all serious sources from various parts of the country report, are longing for the fall of the dictatorship) nor is it in the interest of regional stability - most importantly that of Israel. Furthermore, there is no hope of a peaceful end to the conflict between Israel and Palestine with a Ba'th regime in power in Iraq. Should the radically anti-Israeli and anti-western Ba'th regime survive the conflict unscathed, it would be further proof to Islamist and pan-Arabic terror movements after September 11 that the uncompromising stance in respect to Israel and the USA can lead to success. These widely recognized facts, which have been discussed in the USA, Israel and Great Britain, have received little attention in German public debate. The possible role of the Iraqi opposition has yet to be made out and their statements have not been taken seriously. Ahmed Jalabi, chairman of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), adopted the demand formulated by the DPWG that a future democratic Iraq will rehabilitate Jews persecuted in the name of the past regime and thereby brought about - as did Kanan Makiya - a storm of protest in the Arab media. At any rate, this has proven that the idea of a future Iraqi government that is not explicitly anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist has been heard.

It seems as if the considerations and program of the Iraqi Opposition have already been thoroughly discredited by the German public as they have developed parallel to current American military options. At the same time, the fact that the Iraqi opposition is an independently operating entity which formulated its ideas over ten years ago has been all to easily overlooked. More importantly, the US foreign policy has for the first time allowed the ideas of the Iraqi opposition to be taken into account. Whereas previously the Kurds were seen as a destabilizing factor in an Iraqi centralized state, in the USA the idea of the Kurds as a stabilizing force in a future Iraqi state has gained acceptance. Contrary to popular opinion, the Kurds do not strive for independence, but for a federal system of government within the borders of Iraq.

In Germany, the Iraqi opposition has not been perceived as an independently functioning representative interest. As opposed to the situation in the USA and Great Britain, the positive developments of the last few months have had little effect on public opinion or the position of the federal government - both continue to ignore the Iraqi opposition. This stance, however, is not due to negative perceptions of the opposition in this country, rather it is a question of their material strength. The possibility of a strengthening of the opposition by actively supporting them has not been considered. This in turn leads to false assessment of the situation in the country and in the region as well as a one sided emphasis on the political and economic situation of the ruling regime. In the mean time, even countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey are trying to convince Saddam Hussein to step down. No one in the region seems to assume that Saddam Hussein will survive the conflict unscathed.

Ethnic Splintering, Civil War or Unity

The desire of the Iraqi opposition for national unity must be taken seriously. The history of the opposition is proof of this desire for a democratic new-beginning in Iraq and the Middle East. This however does not necessarily assuage fears of a splintering along religious and ethnic lines. Rather than avoiding the Iraqi opposition out of fear of this collapse, the opposition should be supported and strengthened by any means necessary. In view of the current situation, the success of their undertaking is the only feasible way of preventing Iraq plunging into civil war. The Kurdish parties offer themselves as strong partners within the country which stand by democracy and the unity of the state and do not strive for independence from the Iraqi state. The feared collapse does not begin with the success of the opposition, which is to a large extent borne by the Kurds, but rather with its failure, if the Kurds were forced by a lack of fundamental reform in the Iraqi government (following either a rehabilitation of the regime or, more likely, a coup d'etat within the leadership) to defend Kurdish areas and thereby putting them in the position of preserving territorial and other particular interests. An ethnic or regional splintering of Iraq seems ever more likely the longer the current efforts of the Iraqi opposition are ignored.

Democracy and Stability

It appears as a part of the disaster of the former Middle East policy based upon containment and dual-containment, which has become apparent since September 11, 2001, that stability in the Mashreq was not sought out via democratic development, but rather via the containment of nations and governments whose actual character was dismissed as "domestic politics". That, at least in a world of pan-Islamic and pan-Arabic mobilization, the borders between domestic and foreign policy had long been lifted was illustrated by the debate over Israel and the failure of the Oslo peace accords long before the attacks of Al-Qaeda. Security and stability in the region cannot be provided by totalitarian or dictatorial regimes, but by democratic nations which do not define themselves by their relations to Israel or western states. Critical dialog with dictatorships such as Iraq fail before they can even get underway. Dictatorships, not Democracies, represent a threat to other nations. The future of Iraq will be central to the development of the Middle East. Should the attempt to build a federal democracy under the auspices of rights for all citizens of the state succeed, it would be a foundation for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as well as other Arab countries.

2. Consequences

Talk of a "domino effect" in the Near East is not unwarranted. The fragile stability of the lesser Mashreq nations is dependant on the situation in Iraq. Accordingly, reactions - for example from the Hisbollah - can be expected. The preservation of the status quo carries the risk of a fundamental destabilization. For Iraq and, indeed, the entire Mashreq, there is no alternative to the success of democratic government representing the relative makeup of the country. Neither with Saddam Hussein nor with a possible subsequent military government which does not represent the interests of the majority of the population and the organized opposition, nor with a disintegration of the opposition followed by a retreat to territorial and other special interests accompanied by war over the distribution of territory and resources is in the interest of Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Due to the German governments stance on the military threat to Iraq posed by the United States, Germany has become isolated not only with regards to the position on US military involvement, but also with regards to any possible positive development in the area. The fact that a change in government, whatever form it may take, seems to be unavoidable, Germany finds itself in a position for which it has no developed alternative. The search for alternative development strategies is of utmost importance. This requires not only the acceptance of positive scenarios, but also possible scenarios which take into account the risks involved with the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. From our point of view, the most effective means to combat this risk would be for Germany to take an active role in the formation of an Iraqi government after the fall of Saddam Hussein and to support democratic and stabilizing elements within the group of potential candidates wishing to play a role in a future government. On the other hand, it is not in the interest of Germany to cling to the idea that the status quo can be maintained in a regime that is condemned to collapse. If this were the case, it would appear as if Germany supported the preservation of the Iraqi dictatorship and were opposed to Israeli and American interests in the Middle East.
Yet Germany's stance is of central importance for future Iraqi development. The democratic opposition has hoped for the appropriate signal from Germany for quite some time.

The process which has already begun to form an Iraqi transitional government - supporting the diversity of the population and the varying range of interests - offers a strong possibility. This process, which has many hurdles to overcome as it must turn back the particular interests of individual parties in favor of the creation of a feasible national identity, can only be kept alive through the development of a concrete organizational framework which can put into effect the democratic principals put forth in the DPWG paper "Transition to Democracy". The process will be based on two main principals:

1. The development of a federal system of government with a clear distinction between regional and state authority.

2. The development of a clear framework to address the issue of "de-Ba'thification", the handling of elite members of the current administration, the construction of a democratic educational system, and the reorganization of Ba'th party institutions in a federal-democratic system of government.

In this context, Kanan Makiya, the most prominent representative of the DPWG and member of the transitional committee elected in London, remarked:

"Federalism has become the main issue of the Iraqi opposition....The beginning of this debate goes back to 1992 as the Kurdish parliament voted for a federal state. The Iraqi National Congress (INC) adopted this policy a few months later. (...) This vote was the first of its kind in modern Iraqi and Arabic history. There is no existing literature on this subject - just as there is little experience with federalism in the Arab world. And still almost all members of the Iraqi opposition are speaking up for the idea of federalism. Of course there are differences in opinion as to how this federalism should look. Yet, with few exceptions, everyone accepts that federalism is a necessary foundation for democratization in Iraq and that it is about moving power from Baghdad to the provinces.
The novelty of this federal concept is a part of the continuing novelty of the opposition in Iraq after 1991 - an opposition that is not based on "national liberation", "armed struggle" and the fight against "Zionism" and "imperialism" (all slogans of Arab policy after 1967), but on resistance to their own dictatorship. Admittedly, it was not always easy to work with this opposition; it includes the most varied elements of Iraqi society, it is split into factions and is prone to infighting. Yet practically all of its most important parts agree that representative democracy, rule of law, a pluralistic system of government and federalism must be created in Iraq."

It seems apparent that Germany will stand by its position in respect to a war in Iraq. There are good reasons for this stance. This does not alter the necessity of Germany taking pains to support the democratic alternatives offered by the Iraqi opposition. On the contrary, a change in Iraq is on the agenda and will happen even if there is no military action. The fear of destabilization can only be countered by the effective support of the democratic opposition in the sense of a federal model. Any future ad hoc support stemming from the heat of the moment and not based upon a well founded process of development threatens to exacerbate the existing contradictions instead of conveying a sense of stability and democratization.
If it cannot put forth another alternative other that the preservation of the existing dictatorship, the believability of Germany's Middle East policy will be called into question. It is vital that Germany seek out alternatives to the American military option which are based on stability and democratization, thus helping to avoid conflict. This could in turn open the door to new possibilities.

3)Practical Implementation / Concrete Steps

The transitional committee as well as the various parties have expressed the desire to exchange ideas with experts, academics and politicians in Germany over the possibilities, dangers and problems associated with the creation of a federal system of government in the Middle East. As Kanan Makiya has stated, there is neither experience nor literature on this subject. However there is the serious and declared dedication of the Iraqis. The practical implementation of these concepts depends mainly on the concrete formulation of practical questions such as the form of federal institutions, the police, the structuring of the economy, access to natural resources, etc. Along with this comes the concrete division of power and responsibility along administrative requirements under democratic control and not along ethnic and religious or party clientelism. Germany is a source of experience in this regard. For many Iraqis Germany is a particular example, if not a role model, for the transformation of a centrally administrated, military dictatorship into a federally governed state. In the past decades, several initiatives for the supporting and advising the creation of federal systems of government in other countries have originated in Germany. The experiences gained from its support of the "Truth and Reconciliation Commissions" in South Africa, for example, would be of particular value to the urgent need for a "de Ba'thification" of Iraq.
Until now the material nurturing of the ideas presented in London has been lacking. An exchange in the form of conferences, workshops, training courses, etc. would be an important step for the implementation of the aspired program. An exchange of expertise between Iraqis and Germans and well as professionals from other European countries is in the direct interest of the Iraqi opposition.

This exchange should be understood to be the beginning of institutional cooperation which does not intend to present programs ready for implementation, but rather to "ask the right questions" and take the entire process a step further. Appropriate concepts and suggestions should be presented to the future Iraqi legislature and aid in making decisions when it comes to passing laws. At the same time, this process would help to busy representatives of the various parties with the questions of federal government.

In addition, the concrete support of the development of a federal structure could also have important practical aspects. After a change of regime, regardless of how this takes place, Iraq would be dependant on international aid for the reconstruction of the country. The experience in Kurdish northern Iraq, where the aid money given in the early 90's was for the most part handled by various factions, local élites and parties, which played a significant role in the destabilization of the region, illustrates the importance of an organizational structure accepted by all participating parties and groups. The drawing up and clarification of responsibilities along civil principles (as opposed to proportional systems along ethnic and religious lines) provides the basic foundation for reconstruction which would not lead to separatism among individual groups and conflicts among parties and local élites over aid money.

Concrete Steps

As a first step, we suggest an expert hearing on the subject of federalism and "de-Ba'thification". This is in the expressed interest of the transitional committee elected in London, the DPWG and many Iraqi political parties. Members of the transitional committee, members of the DPWG and the Kurdish Regional Government. Iraqi experts and members of the opposition and international experts on Iraq as well as experts in the fields of federal government and experts in civil law from the areas of administration, the judiciary, the police, cultural politics and the universities should all be invited. The goal is to identify main problem areas, formulate individual questions relevant to concrete development and to delegate working groups whose work should be laid out over the long term.
A second main focus is the overcoming of the Ba'th dictatorship in Iraq. The Iraqi Ba'th party has been in power since 1968. No Iraqi younger than 35 can remember life before Ba'th party rule. The Iraqi state apparatus is so organized that a clear line cannot be drawn between public and private life. Even the day to day aspects of ordinary life are influenced by the state and party organization. Not only with regards to the party elite, but also the many thousands involved in the Iraqi government illustrate the urgent problems associated with overcoming Ba'th party rule. The Iraqi opposition has shown interest in the experiences of other countries (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). In the past, German experts in the transformation of a dictatorship into a democracy have lent assistance (Prof. Tomuschat).

The hearing should be prepared using principle papers addressing specific subject areas so that the main questions can be thoroughly discussed. The goal should be the creation of individual long-term workshops which can lay down a basic framework and pass on any suggestions - translated into both Arabic and Kurdish - to a future Iraqi legislature.
A result of the hearing should be an institutionalized form of discussion and further development of models of a federal and democratic government which should advise from below the governmental level, but also accompany the development of a future Iraq.

Thomas Uwer / Thomas von der Osten-Sacken / Hans Branscheid