What role has emergency aid played in rebuilding people's lives in Iraqi Kurdistan and how far can it contribute to long-term development?

KurdishMedia.com - By Monica Napier | 17/01/2001

"Emergencies are costly in terms of human life and resources. They are disruptive of development and they demand a long period of rehabilitation" (Buchanon-Smith and Maxwell, 1994:2). The result of these atrocities, of war, bloodshed and dispossession in Iraqi Kurdistan has left; over 100,000 people unaccounted for since 1988 mainly due to the Anfal. An estimated 5,000 deaths have been caused by chemical attacks, and during 1988 over 55,000 Kurds fled to Turkey with a similar number fleeing to Iran (New Internationalist, 1999). The problems and destruction, which has occurred in Iraqi Kurdistan can be described as a complex emergency; as this is a crisis which has been characterised by political, economic and social destabilisation. These victims of war are in need of emergency aid, not only at the height of war, but also need assistance to reconstruct their lives after the after math of the disasters that have occurred (Weiss & Collins, 1996). Emergency Relief is the immediate response to a disaster, providing basic needs of, temporary shelter, health, sanitation and water, and protection, in order to reduce the threat of excess mortality. Long-term development, is intended to sustain and improve a population's capacity to access basic needs, whilst increasing their self-reliance to reduce dependence on externally provided resources in order to sustain a livelihood. This essay aims to demonstrate how emergency aid in Iraqi-Kurdistan has generally failed to support any major formation of long-term development of the country and has only provided minimal support towards rebuilding the lives of the Iraqi Kurds. The essay will draw out the idea that there needs to be integration between relief and development assistance in order for a nation to rebuild and maintain a sustainable livelihood for the future.

In March of 1991, Kurdish cities fell very rapidly to rebels, and Iraqi Kurdistan was liberated. Freedom in the area did not last long, since as soon as Saddam Hussein subdued the Shi'ites in Southern Iraq he turned his army on the Kurds in the North of Iraq. Swiftly and ruthlessly he defeated the Kurds. A consequence of this event was a mass exodus of over one million Kurds to Turkey and Iran. Hence emergency aid was implemented for the Kurds. The first initiatives were the airdrops to the Turkey-Iraq border from Operation Provide Comfort. At the same time a 'safe haven' and no-fly zone above the 36th parallel was created. The aim of the 'safe-haven' and no-fly zones was to provide a degree of protection to the Kurds in hope that it would encourage the Kurds to return to Northern Iraq. It would also act as a protection to the humanitarian aid staff, and allow the allied troops to enter into Iraq to deliver humanitarian aid. An initiative by the UNHCR encouraged the tens of thousands of Kurds that fled to Iran and Turkey to return to Iraq (Keen, 1993). In the winter of 1991 and 1992 the United Nations (UN) implemented its emergency 'winterisation' programme with the building of pre fabricated huts in hope to re-establish the Kurds returning from Turkey and Iran.

The first implementation of relief to the Kurds between April and June 1991 made an important impact on the Kurds as it contributed to the immediate welfare of the Iraqi Kurds. During this time the NGOs in Iraqi Kurdistan pushed for an emphasis, from a relief orientated focus towards the rehabilitation of rural areas, which were in need of repair of infrastructure and projects with a medium term time framework. One can identify that there were some efforts to integrate the two types of aid, even though the donor governments and other funding agencies were not supplying aid for these circumstances. 'The lack of enthusiasm among donors and the UN has been particularly evident in the sphere of non-emergency aid, even though one might normally expect a shift at this stage from emergency aid to more developmental assistance' (Keen, 1993: 41). The government of Iraq obstructed the many projects that the NGOs tried to implement in the rehabilitation programme. This exacerbated the inability to obtain resources. The area of Northern Kurdistan is very fertile, and ideal for agricultural rehabilitation. To fund a project in this prime area is an attractive proposal. As it would eventually lead to individuals becoming self-sufficient, then there would be no need for expensive complicated relief operations in the future. The ODA (now DFID) gave agricultural support towards implementing projects in the area in 1993. These programmes were however not sufficient enough nor were the commitments towards the projects. Thus this developed into more food distribution and dependency, because of the economic devastation of Iraqi-Kurdistan (Keen, 1993). The government of Iraq obstructed emergency aid by manipulating exchange rates, engaging in terrorist activities and blocking visas and travel permits to relief workers. This was a major set back for the efficient delivery of aid, and the hope to rebuild the Kurdish peoples' lives again was shattered. With emergency aid obstructed, it was beginning to look impossible to see any foreseeable and successful long-term initiatives developed.

The relief oriented NGOs and donor governments were faced with three major problems. Firstly it was virtually impossible to guarantee security to the Kurds, secondly there was persistent under-funding of humanitarian assistance and finally there was an increased obstruction of humanitarian assistance by the government of Iraq. The UNHCR took over relief responsibilities in 1991 from all allied forces. The UNHCR were able to render significant assistance towards the Kurds. In this case the 'winterisation' programme of 1991 had some impact in Iraqi Kurdistan since shelters were erected for over 1,000 families. The WFP distributed drugs and food to one million Kurds in the space of three months. Keen (1993) argues that there was a general lack of encouragement of productive activities such as agriculture and industry; this was accompanied with a general lack of security. This led to the Kurdish people resorting to activities with very short-term gains. The director of Save the Children Fund (SCF) indicates how the existing pattern of aid 'has tended to promote the decay of the economy, rather than any development' (Keen, 1993:39). In such circumstances as in Kurdistan the Kurds have been involved in very unproductive activities such as selling capital assets, smuggling and chopping tress down, extracting copper and barbed wire from mine fields. The fundamental problem here is not turning any savings into long-term investment.

In May of 1992, Kurdish elections took place in order to form a regional power of authority in Iraqi Kurdistan. These elections ended in a fifty-fifty split between the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both parties were seeking ultimate political supremacy. From this period onwards there were various outbreaks of fighting between the PUK and the KUP. By the April of 1992 the UNHCR began to phase out a number of their activities in Northern Iraq, thus UNICEF took responsibility for ensuring basic needs of water, sanitation, health and education.

Rural rehabilitation has been a major programme in Iraqi Kurdistan by the Save the Children Fund. A £2million programme lasting 12 months was funded by ODA (now DFID). This programme relocated 716 families and constructed 1,653 village homes as well as the implementation of water and sanitation projects, health clinics and schools in the hope to build back the lives of the Iraqi Kurds. In the course of the programme participation at all levels was highly encouraged, in order to achieve a high output of sustainability. The SCF suggested numerous forms of project work to generate the economy and improve the quality of life and self-sufficiency, for a more sustainable future. The suggestions of new initiatives were in many cases pointless, as it has been argued that since the Kurds received only basic necessities, which did not provide enough; they had already tried other initiatives to generate an economy. "Job creation or income generation in towns remains problematic; there are few if any successful examples, in a region with a stagnant economy, where both international sanctions and internal tax checkpoints make import of raw materials and export of finished goods very difficult"(Save the children Fund, 1995:3). This demonstrates how it has been almost virtually impossible for NGOs to implement any form of sustainable projects, which could generate incomes because of numerous internal and external setbacks. It is evident that emergency aid, to a county is so deep-rooted in political conflicts will have no long-term effects, because it seems there is not much more one can do to transform the situation and provide a better future. Following these failed initiatives most project work has been directed at service provision, providing needs such as electricity, water and sanitation. The key question is will these projects be sustainable for the future? If conflict is still arising, and no formal economy is being maintained, eventually it must be feared that funds will run out and the services become inefficient, thus reverting to the former conditions.

The UN implemented their emergency programmes in six-month arrangements and in some aspects this could be looked upon as very unrealistic and unsustainable. How can a programme be implemented in such a short-space of time in order for it to be fully sustainable and benefit the population? Are there not deeper factors to consider when implementing a project that is meant to be sustainable and rebuild the lives back of individuals to something that was better than they had before? Walker (1994) argues that 'now the days of quick-in and quick-out assistance programmes are over… these assistance programmes now, have to be measured in years as opposed to a few months… as a result there is serious concern over the inherently unsustainable nature of the way in which international relief is being practised. Most NGOs believe that the closeness of their work on the ground will increase the livelihoods of individuals and that their assistance will really support local development. 'However, most also see a division between their relief work and their development. They have established principles for development work and which they frequently abandon in the face of the perceived urgency of a disaster' (Anderson and Woodrow, 1989:2).

Woodrow and Anderson (1993) argue that the opportunities for harnessing emergency work for development has often been missed. In such cases the response to a disaster in the form of relief aid has not contributed at all to long-term development, it has actually subverted or undermined any possible development work. Anderson and Woodrow (1989) argue that this no longer needs to be the case, and that the two processes can work together. They argue that if the number of relief agencies are increasing then there is a need for these agencies to have a design in their programmes which incorporates long-term development planning programmes, because this is now an ever increasing important issue to relief interventions. If this is the case it will benefit not only the people of the disaster for the future but it can be more productive for the development agency.

When an NGO is expected to respond to immediate humanitarian relief, many of the development goals are often lost or at least deferred while emergency efforts prevail. In many cases all development work is completely abandoned in the face of a huge crisis, this can have detrimental effects for the future of the country. What may look like a positive contribution to getting the country back on their feet may actually be a hindrance i.e. the country becoming heavily dependent on hand outs. There is a conceptual divide between emergency relief and rehabilitation and development work, although they both are frequently administrated through the same government agency. 'Emergency aid funds are earmarked for humanitarian relief for an unexpected crisis… while development assistance is budgeted by governments to foster economic and social advancement in generally less economically advanced countries that have traditionally represented some economic or security concern for a particular government' (Weiss, Collins, 1996: 50). In such a case it is very, and often complicated since those that deliver emergency relief and those that deliver assistance reconstruction and development do not communicate much together. Therefore as (Weiss and Collins, 1969:115) demonstrate, 'Logically, if humanitarian systems know that reconstruction and development funds will not be available during the post conflict period, efforts to relieve acute suffering should try and incorporate actions to empower locals and to use relief input in a manner complementary to longer-term objectivity'.

The implementation of emergency aid by the UN and numerous other NGOs has been greatly constrained, and has affected the integration of emergency aid to long-term development. Thus the inability to rebuild back the lives of the Iraqi Kurds. A huge structural constraint to emergency aid, contributing towards the hindrance of development of long-term aid are the political situations occurring in the region. The break-up and conflict between the two parties, the KDP and PUK, has resulted in a breakdown of the administrative structure. This division has caused there to be a lack of provision of public services such as schools and health clinics, since there is no funding to let alone build or even employ doctors or teachers to work in the services. A further problem to this situation is that, the international bodies did not recognise the Kurdish region as a complete state. Therefore one hundred percent backing from international bodies is non-existent. The government of Iraq has acted as a major obstruction to events in Iraqi Kurdistan. This is because not only did the government obstruct emergency aid, but they also obstructed the entry of numerous types of resources to the area for long-term development. The government was also very territorial about areas such as Kirkuk which are very oil rich, as it did not want this prime area to be in the hands of the Kurds, since this would be an ideal opening to generate a new economy and rebuild life once again.

The neighbouring states Iran and Turkey have played a major political role in the situation. Thousands of Iraqi Kurds have fled to these two states seeking refuge, and there are minority groups of Kurds in each of these two countries. This has caused problems when deciding how to implement projects to rehabilitate or rebuild the lives of the Iraqi Kurds, as it is feared, the Kurds in the other two countries may up rise against the Turkish or Iranian governments. Politically and strategically the international bodies' hands are tied, as they want to keep on the side of all three groups. This is because the Turkish and Iranian borders provide strategic movements of resources and Turkey is a major participant in NATO.

Land mines are a major killer in any war torn region. In Iraqi Kurdistan the landmines greatly impinge upon development. In order for development to take place and be of success it was important that the mines were cleared. Sadly virtually no aid was given towards the removal of landmines and, it has impinged on long-term development in those villages and agricultural areas that were effected by landmines. It meant thousands of Kurds could not move back to their villages and hundreds were injured or killed by the explosions from the mines.

The implementation of international sanctions affected the people of Iraq greatly. There was very limited access to resources, and the resources that were available, were of very high prices, resulting in people becoming very dependent which exacerbated the vulnerability of the Individual. The Iraqi Kurds were especially hit by these sanctions because they were faced with double sanctions. When the government of Iraq implemented a tight embargo on the Iraqi Kurds, i.e. on goods crossing the de facto borders. There were virtually no rations for the Kurds and the government withdrew funds, troops, and services form all Kurdish regions. This is a major constraint to any long-term development since people literally have no resources, so can not even attempt to rebuild the basic framework of their lives. The very fact that the government of Iraq had a policy on the persecution and displacement of Kurds, especially in the oil rich areas of Kirkuk meant that a great number of Kurds were displaced from their villages. This created the urgent need for them to start anew and to rebuild their lives.

"We know, and are humbled by the fact, that some aid makes a negative difference. It harms people more than it helps them"(Anderson and Woodrow, 1989:95). There is a need to find a way in which aid is truly supportive of development. "It is essential that every act of assistance contributes to the goal of enabling people to gain self-sustaining economic and social security. It is also essential that we see this goal as immediate and attainable, not as some "pie in the futuristic sky" dream which we really have no genuine hope of responsibility for achieving"(Anderson and Woodrow, 1989:95). There have been numerous gaps in relief and development work, between the principles, the policies and practice, and this has been demonstrated in the Iraqi-Kurdistan case where today people are still highly vulnerable and development is taking its time to help to rebuild the lives back of the Kurdish people. What can be seen here, is a situation of doom and gloom, a case of a zero sum game. Although international aid, it could be argued, was not significantly effective in rebuilding the lives of the local people. It may have helped in small areas as those who have been resettled in the villages are beginning to rebuild their lives back, thus some sustainable outcome will hopefully appear. In such a situation as Iraqi Kurdistan it could be argued that it is a very difficult situation for the UN and NGOs to act in truly effective forms considering the long-term, since there are so many dimensions to the situation and so many people involved in the process. At the end of the day, the Kurds will need to use their own strategies to maintain a long-term development. The economic embargo which Iraq deployed on Iraqi-Kurdistan from 1991-1997; enabled the Kurds at this time to receive a much higher level of international humanitarian aid per capita than the rest of Iraq, the hope was it would compensate for the double-embargo that was implemented on the people of Kurdistan. This did lead to a small amount of success in that in some rural areas the rural economy was restored and people were relocated to their villages. This was very much dependent on agriculture and a thriving smuggling trade which can not be said to be very sustainable for any development of the future economy. Buchanon-Smith and Maxwell (1994:2) argue " 'better development' can reduce the need for emergency relief; better relief can contribute to development; and better rehabilitation can ease the transition between the two". The main aim of relief when integrating it with long-term development is that it should not undermine or impinge any forms of future development. The relief and development linkages must assure basic relief in order that all human life is protected to the very best (Maxwell and Lirenzo, 1994). There are problems to constrain choices on relief-to-development continuum are; 'resources are limited, donors prefer loud emergencies and relief agencies emphasise delivery of assistance rather than local's empowerment and the media focus on outsiders helping victims rather than the insiders taking charge of their own future' (Weiss & Collins, 1996:157).

An anxiety expressed by the KDP's leader Massoud Barzani about the state of Kurdistan; 'If there is no political decision, this so-called 'safe-haven' is short-lived, whether it is six months or a year. And what then? That is the question. We want a lasting solution - a political one. Our question is not simply a humanitarian issue. This humanitarian disaster is the consequence of our problem not being solved politically' (Laizer, 1996:54). These anxieties expressed here demonstrate how it is a problem that is very politically tied. In such a case neither types of aid will work at their full optimum especially long-term aid. In order to provide sustainable livelihoods the political constraints more than anything else need to be resolved. Sadly the Iraqi Kurdistan situation seems to be at a dead lock, and it appears that there is no urgency by any particular body in unlocking it.

References

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• Benthall, J., 1993, Disasters, relief and the media, London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd
• Buchanon-Smith, M. and Maxwell, S., 1994, Linking relief and development: an introduction and overview. In IDS Bulletin Vol. 25 no 4
• Duffield, M., 1994, Complex emergencies and the crisis of developmentalism. In IDS Bulletin Vol. 25 no 4
• Graham-Brown, Sarah., 1999, Uncertain Future, The New Internationalist 316: 24-25
• Hinshelwood, Emily., 1999, Lecture Notes for module DV-313 Anthropology and Development: People, Knowledge and Intervention
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